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Summary 
;e extent to which humans have a preference for fairness is a puzzling phenomenon. Hu-
mans share food, goods, power, services and other resources fairly with their family, friends 
and even unrelated others (Fehr & Rockenbach, 2004; Gintis, 2000; Melis & Semmann, 2010). 
Further humans have strong preferences for being treated fairly themselves and also for oth-
ers being treated fairly (Bendor, 1990; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). ;is uniquely human be-
havior has been object of research in several disciplines. Psychologists, economists, sociolo-
gists, neuroscientists, biologists, lawyers as well as anthropologists have tried to understand 
this astonishing prosocial behavior (Cook & Hardin, 2001; Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2003; 
Henrich et al., 2014; Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1973; Weiner, Graham, & Reyna, 1997). 
Fairness can be observed across cultures and is already present in young children (Fehr, 
Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008;  Ellickson, 2001; Ostrom 2000) suggesting that fair behavior 
has evolutionary advantages and a underlying neural basis.  
 In recent years, there has been substantial progress in understanding neural mecha-
nisms enforcing fair behavior. Psychological as well as economic theories were tested for their 
neurological plausibility (Dulebohn, Conlon, Sarinopoulos, Davison, & McNamara, 2009; 
Güroğlu, van den Bos, Rombouts, & Crone, 2010; Hsu, Anen, & Quartz, 2008). For that pur-
pose paradigms from behavioral economics were adapted and tested in the fMRI scanner. 
Brain areas found to correlate with fair behavior were further tested for their causal involve-
ment by using TMS or tDCS (Knoch, Pascual-Leone, Meyer, Treyer, & Fehr, 2006; Ru>, 
Ugazio, & Fehr, 2013; A. Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003; Strang, Gross, 
et al., 2015; Van't Wout, Kahn, Sanfey, & Aleman, 2005).  
 In this dissertation I give a systematic overview about psychological and economic 
theories on fair behavior and their neurological plausibility. I further present four studies on 
fairness investigated with di>erent neuroscientiFc methods and using di>erent paradigms. 
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1 Introduction 
Imagine it is your birthday and you are celebrating it with eight friends of yours. One of them 
prepared your favorite cake and gives it to you as a birthday present. You are very hungry and 
since you like the cake very much, you would prefer to eat the whole cake on your own. What 
are you going to do next? Instead of eating the whole cake on your own, you probably share 
the cake with your friends (Figure 1). ;ere are several options how to divide the cake. ;ree 
possible options are the following: 1) You could count the number of people present and 
divide the cake into eight equally sized pieces (Figure 1A). 2) You could divide the cake into 
eight pieces but make your piece and the one of the cake-maker larger, since you both deserve 
more (Figure 1B). 3) Or you divide the cake into two small, two large and four medium sized 
pieces according to how much everyone needs (Figure 1C). ;e two small pieces are for your 
chubby friends, the two large pieces for your skinny friends and the medium sizes for you 
and the others. Most people would probably consider all options as more or less fair. ;e 
question is, why do you share the cake with others while you would prefer to eat it on your 
own? And what do you consider as a fair split? One answer might be, because as humans we 
have social norms that tell us what is fair and how to behave in these social situations. And if 
you do not adhere to these norms, you might Fnd yourself celebrating your next birthday 
alone.  
 
Figure 1. Possible options about how to split a birthday cake. A) Dividing the cake 
into equally sized pieces according to number of  people present; B) dividing the 
cake into six small and two large pieces; C) dividing the cake into two large pieces, 
two small pieces and four medium size pieces.  
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2 Outlook 
In this dissertation, I focus on one particular social norm, the norm to be fair. ;e Frst part 
of my dissertation provides an overview of the theoretical background of the topic. First, I 
will discuss psychological and economical concepts of fairness. ;en I will shortly explain 
current neuroscientiFc methods that allow investigating brain activity in healthy subjects. I 
will also give an overview of the brain areas that have been found to be associated with fair 
behavior. In the second part, I will introduce three studies on fairness. ;e Frst one is about 
the neural correlates of strategic fairness. ;e others are about restorative fairness from dif-
ferent perspectives, as a transgressor, as a victim and as a third party. In the Frst study, we 
used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS; Strang, Gross, Schuhmann, Riedl, Weber and 
Sack, 2015), in the second and third study functional magnetic imaging (fMRI; Strang, 
Utikal, Fischbacher, Weber, & Falk, 2014 and Hu, Strang and Weber, 2015), and in the last 
one a purely behavioral paradigm (Strang, Kuss, Grote, Q Park & Weber, in preparation). By 
investigating fairness from di>erent perspectives and by using a variety of methods, I con-
tribute to obtaining a multidimensional view on fairness and its neural basis. 
Part I 
  
2 Part I 
1 Social norms 
We as humans have a highly complex system of social norm which is uniquely human and 
essential for the functioning of our society (Ernst Fehr & Rockenbach, 2004; Gintis, 2003; 
Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2003). Social norms are generally deFned as unwritten statements that 
are based on widely shared beliefs about how individual group members should act in certain 
situations. ;ey guide our choices in social interactions and thereby facilitate social behavior. 
;ey are object of research in various research Felds; sociology, anthropology, psychology, 
law and more recently economics. Although intensively studied, there is no consensus on one 
common deFnition between but also within research disciplines investigating them.  
;omas Hobbes was one of the Frsts to recognize the need for social norms, or social 
contract, as he called it. According to Hobbes, people are willing to Fght against each other 
by nature, making life in large groups diHcult. But since people dislike this unstable environ-
ment, they have a desire for social order. Social norms fulFll this desire, since they allow us 
to live in large groups of genetically unrelated others by guiding our behavior (Horne, 2001). 
Although social norms di>er between groups, they are omnipresent; every human group or 
society has a social norm system (Ellickson, 2001). According to Ostrom (2000), humans 
have a predisposition to learn social norms, and they do this through socialization (Fine, 
2001; Gintis, 2003b). 
 Many of our everyday situations are mixed-motive social dilemmas, like the example in 
the introduction (Figure 1). ;ese are situations in which immediate self-interests are in con-
Tict with beneFts for another individual, the group or society at one’s own expense. For so-
ciologists and psychologists these are typical situations in which social norms help to guide 
behavior. However, according to classical economic theory these situations are no dilemmas; 
a homo oeconomicus only tries to maximize his own utility and disregards others. ;us he 
will always choose the selFsh option - eating the entire cake. However, fortunately, most peo-
ple are not purely selFsh; they care about the welfare of others. ;ese so called other-regard-
ing preferences are incorporated in more recent economic theories (Falk et al., 2003; Fehr & 
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Falk, 2002; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). A variety of research has shown that people oGen choose 
the non-selFsh option (Camerer & ;aler, 2014; Guth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982), 
indicating that people value social norm compliant behavior.  
1.1 Maintenance of social norms 
People are even willing to punish norm violators. When being victim of a norm violation 
people invest their own money to punish the transgressor (second party punishment; Egas & 
Riedl, 2008; Fehr & Gächter, 2002). Interestingly, people are also willing to punish norm vi-
olators at their own expense as third parties (Axelrod, 1986; Ellickson, 2001; Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2004; Hechter, 1984; Hu, Strang & Weber, 2015). As a third party people only 
observe a norm violation but are not personally involved in the transgression. In a study by 
Fehr & Fischbacher (2004b) 50% of the participants punished norm violators as third parties. 
;us, although it is costly and they do not have any direct beneFts from it, a large fraction of 
people punishes norm violators, probably in order to enforce norm compliant behavior.   
Since social norms are informal, oGen vaguely deFned and hence easy to circumvent, 
their widespread prevalence is puzzling (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Melis & Semmann, 2010). 
Indeed, experiments have shown that prosocial behavior declines without credible sanction-
ing mechanisms (Egas & Riedl, 2008; Gächter, Renner, & SeGon, 2008; Ule, Schram, Riedl, & 
Cason, 2009). ;us, some people behave norm compliant only due to the expectation that 
violations will be punished. ;ese people are strategically prosocial. Since several of our so-
cial norms are part of our legislative these are enforced by law (Ellickson, 2001), while others 
are enforced by the social group (Axelrod, 1986; Gächter et al., 2008; Hechter, 1984). Both 
forms of sanctioning threats help to enforce and thereby maintain social norms in society. 
Taken together, previous research has shown that many people behave according to social 
norms and that they try to enforce norm compliant behavior in others. However, there is 
considerable variation between people; some do not act as prosocially as others do. Messick 
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and McClintock (1968) recognized these di>erences and developed the social value orienta-
tion measurement to asses those. Participants are asked to make several allocations between 
themselves and others. Based on this they are categorized as cooperators (maximizing joint 
payo>s), individualists (maximizing own payo>s), competitors (maximizing the di>erences 
between own and other payo>s) and altruists (maximizing other’s payo>s). ;is measure-
ment was shown to correlate with prosocial behavior (Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009; Van 
Lange, 1999). In line with the concept of other-regarding preferences, the largest fraction of 
people (ca. 45%; Balliet et al., 2009) is categorized as cooperators, valuing other people’s out-
comes.  
1.2 Deviant social behavior in patients 
Some neurological patients with frontal lobe damages have diHculties to behave according 
to social norms (Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1990; Harlow, 1993; Rudebeck, Bannerman, 
& Rushworth, 2008). Phineas Gage is probably the most famous of these patients. As for the 
other patients his brain damage to the frontal lobe resulted in a profound and sudden change 
of his social behavior (Damasio, Grabowski, Frank, Galaburda, & Damasio, 1994). He had 
problems to behave according to social norms and was rather impulsive and egoistic. His 
deFcits were constrained to the social domain; he had no learning problems, no deFcits in 
language or perception and a normal IQ (Damasio et al., 1994; Harlow, 1993). Importantly, 
all patients showed normal social behavior before their injuries. ;us, the data of these pa-
tients suggest that there is a speciFc part in our brain involved in social norm compliant be-
havior.  
2 Fairness 
One very prevalent social norm is the norm to cooperate and to do this in a fair way (Cook 
& Hardin, 2001). As humans we share food, goods, power, services and other resources with 
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our family, friends and unrelated others (Ernst Fehr & Rockenbach, 2004; Gintis, 2000; Melis 
& Semmann, 2010). Children at the age of 7-8 already prefer to allocate resources in a fair 
way (equal split; Ernst Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008), showing that we are able to 
behave according to fairness norms from an early age on. Further we have strong preferences 
both for being treated fairly ourselves and also for others being treated fairly (Bendor & 
Mookherjee, 1990; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004, Hu et al., 2015). ;is norm of fair behavior has 
been the object of research in several disciplines. Psychologists, economists, sociologists, 
neuroscientists, biologists, lawyers as well as anthropologists have tried to understand this 
astonishing uniquely human prosocial behavior (Cook & Hardin, 2001; Falk et al., 2003; 
Gintis, 2000; Henrich et al., 2014; Walster et al., 1973; Weiland et al., 2012; Weiner et al., 
1997). However, although studied intensively there is no consensus on one uniform deFni-
tion or concept of fairness. In the following I will concentrate on economic and psychological 
concepts of fairness. 
2.1 Economic concept of fairness 
According to standard economic theory people will not behave fairly since fair behavior usu-
ally does not maximize their own utility (Varian, 2010). ;us, to return to the example from 
the beginning (Figure 1), according to standard economic theory we will eat the whole cake 
on our own, instead of sharing it with our friends. ;ere are several economic games used to 
investigate social behavior and to probe standard economic theory. ;e most popular are the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Dictator Game, the Trust Game and the Ultimatum Game. ;e ma-
jor advantage of these games is that they are very simple and mathematically well-speciFed, 
in the sense that it is possible to calculate the “optimal” behavior for each player in the game. 
In this dissertation I will focus on the Ultimatum Game. Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze 
(1982) were among the Frsts who used the Ultimatum Game to test the predictions of eco-
nomic standard theory. ;ey used the Ultimatum Game to investigate how people distribute 
resources.  
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2.1.1 The Ultimatum Game 
;e standard Ultimatum Game is a two-person bargaining game. One player, the proposer, 
receives a certain monetary endowment and is asked to divide it between him/herself and 
another player, the receiver. ;e receiver can then decide whether to accept the allocation or 
to reject it. In case that the receiver accepts the o>er from the proposer, both receive the 
respective amounts of money. However, in case that the receiver rejects the o>er, both, pro-
poser and receiver, do not get any money (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. In the Ultimatum Game, the proposer can offer an amount to the receiver 
and the receiver can either accept or reject the offer. In case the receiver accepts 
the offer, both players receive their respective payoffs (proposer: endowment – x; 
receiver: x). In case the receiver rejects the offer, both players do not receive any 
money.  
Standard economic theory predicts that the proposer should o>er the smallest possible 
amount to the receiver. Moreover, since the receiver is supposed to maximize his or her pay-
o>s as well, he or she should accept any amount o>ered. AGer all, any amount should be 
preferred over nothing. In the study by Güth et al. (1982) participants did not behave accord-
ing to these standard predictions; proposers did o>er money to the receivers and receivers 
rejected unfair o>ers (here deFned as non-equal split). ;us, both players did not exclusively 
try to maximize their payo>s. Receivers explained their decision in the following way, “If 
player 1 leG a fair amount to me, I will accept. If not and if I do not sacriFce too much, I will 
punish him by choosing conTict (reject)” (Güth et al., 1982, p. 384). ;us, receivers were 
willing to punish unfair behavior of proposers. Moreover, proposers in turn seemed to antic-
ipate this, since they stated: “I have to leave at least an amount for player 2 so that he will 
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consider the costs of choosing conTict (rejection) as too high” (Güth et al., 1982, p. 384). ;e 
Fndings of Güth et al. (1982) were replicated in a variety of subsequent studies (Sanfey, 
Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003; Suleiman, 1996; Van’t Wout, Kahn, Sanfey, & 
Aleman, 2006; Weg & Smith, 1993). Usually, allocations of 40–50% of the proposer’s endow-
ment are accepted and allocations below 20% are rejected in about 50% of the cases (Camerer, 
2003). ;us, the economic standard hypothesis of purely selFsh payo> maximizers can be 
rejected. When facing a conTict between selFsh impulses and fairness norms both players in 
the Ultimatum Game incorporate fairness norms into their decision (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Conflict between the selfish impulse to maximize monetary payoffs and 
fairness norms in proposer and receiver in the Ultimatum Game. 
2.1.2 Fair-share hypothesis and expectation hypothesis of fairness 
Subsequent economic models have accounted for people’s predisposition for fairness. Two 
alternative hypothesis to the standard theory have arisen; the fair-share hypothesis 
(Kahneman, Knetsch, & ;aler, 1986) and the expectation hypothesis (Ho>man, McCabe, 
Smith, Ho>man, & McCabe, 1996; Weg & Smith, 1993). ;e fair-share hypothesis predicts 
that proposers will split their endowment equally between themselves and the receiver (in 
the introduction example, splitting the cake in equally sized pieces, see Figure 1A). According 
to this hypothesis people should always make fair o>ers, even when the receiver does not 
have the possibility to reject. ;is hypothesis can be tested by using the Dictator Game. ;e 
Dictator Game is, as the Ultimatum Game, a two-person bargaining game. However, in con-
trast to the Ultimatum Game, the receiver is passive; he or she cannot reject the o>er made 
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by the proposer. ;e fair-share hypothesis predicts that allocations in the Ultimatum Game 
should not be di>erent from those in the Dictator Game. Ho>man et al. (1996) demonstrated 
that this prediction is wrong; allocations di>er substantially between the two games. Propos-
ers in the Dictator Game transferred less money (but still more than predicted by standard 
economic theories) to receivers compared to proposers in the Ultimatum Game. ;ese results 
show that fairness cannot be the only consideration proposers take into account when mak-
ing their decisions. Ho>man et al. (1996) suggested that it is not a predisposition for fairness 
but rather strategic reasoning that drives proposer’s allocation decision in the Ultimatum 
Game. People incorporate their expectations about how the receiver will decide into their 
decisions and act strategically fair. ;ey anticipate that they will be punished for unfair o>ers 
and try to avoid that by making fair o>ers (for more details on strategic fairness see Part II.2).  
2.1.3 Inequity aversion 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) proposed an alternative explanation for people’s fair behavior in 
the Ultimatum Game. ;ey suggest that some people are inequity-averse. According to ineq-
uity-aversion people’s utility decreases when outcomes are unequal and they are therefore 
willing to make fair o>ers and to punish inequity, both at their own expenses. Fehr and 
Schmidt suggest that inequity-averse people dislike all transfers di>erent from 50%. More 
speciFcally, they assume that 80% transfers are disliked as much as 20%. In line with the ex-
pectation hypothesis they assume that proposers form beliefs about the behavior of the re-
ceiver in case they do not know their preferences and behave accordingly. ;us, inequity 
averse proposers, who believe that the receiver is inequity averse as well, will make fair o>ers 
of 50%.  
2.1.4 Reciprocal fairness 
Another driving factor of fairness seems to be reciprocity (Fehr & Falk, 2002). ;ere are two 
forms of reciprocity; positive reciprocity and negative reciprocity. ;e former means that 
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people are willing to sacriFce own resources to be kind to those who were kind to them, while 
the latter means that people are willing to costly punish those who were unkind. ;is mech-
anism is suggested to drive behavior in repeated as well as in one shot situations (Fehr & Falk, 
2002). ;e former situation is straightforward, if someone was kind to you, you will be nice 
to him or her next time (trial) as well. However, the latter situation is less obvious. According 
to Fehr and Falk (2002) people anticipate whether the other person will be reciprocal and 
behave according to this expectation in one-shot situations. ;us people have expectations 
about other people’s reciprocity. 
2.1.5 Intentions matter 
When judging the fairness of a distribution in addition to the material consequences of an 
outcome the intention of the proposer matters. Falk et al. (2003) showed that the same allo-
cation from a proposer can be judged as fair and unfair depending on the alternatives he or 
she had. Participants played four di>erent versions of Mini-Ultimatum Game, meaning that 
the proposer’s choice set was limited to two options. ;e Frst option was identical across all 
versions; 80% for themselves and 20% for the receiver (80/20). ;e alternative options were: 
50% for each (50/50) in condition one, 20% for the proposer and 80% for the receiver (20/80) 
in condition two, 80% for the proposer and 20% for the receiver (80/20) in condition three 
and 100% for the proposer and 0% for the receiver (100/0) in condition four. 18% of the 
receivers rejected the 80/20 allocation when the proposer had actually no choice because the 
alternative was 80/20 as well. ;e behavior of these 18% can be explained by inequity aver-
sion. However, when the alternative option is 50/50, even 45% of the receivers reject the 80/20 
allocation, signiFcantly more compared to the other conditions. ;us, although objectively 
identical, receivers rejected o>ers when the proposer had a fair alternative. ;e results suggest 
that intentions of the proposer matter in addition to objective outcomes when evaluating 
fairness (Falk et al., 2003; Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2008).  
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2.1.6 Emotions 
Emotions might be another important factor inTuencing our decision to either accept or re-
ject an unfair o>er as a receiver in an Ultimatum Game as well. Several studies using behav-
ioral and psychophysiological measurements have shown that unfair o>ers elicit negative 
emotions (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; Sanfey et al., 2003; Van’t Wout et al., 2006). Straub 
and Murnighan (1995) suggested that negative emotions lead people to reject o>ers (for more 
details see Part II.5). ;is idea is supported by Fndings showing that negative emotions are 
correlated with higher rejection rates (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; Sanfey et al., 2003; Van’t 
Wout et al., 2006). Unfair o>ers induce a conTict between cognitive and emotional processes 
in the receiver. On the one hand the receiver wants to increase his or her payo>s but on the 
other hand he or she is upset about the unfair o>ers and wants to restore fairness but also to 
restore his or her internal emotional state by punishing the proposer. Since both motives in-
Tuence each other it is diHcult to disentangle the two processes in a behavioral experiment.  
In summary, people seem to have a general concern for fairness. However, people are not 
unconditionally fair, they are strategically fair by incorporating expectations about other’s 
behavior into their decision. Finally, when assessing the fairness of a distribution, it is not 
only the Fnal outcome that matters, but also the intention of the one who made the distribu-
tion. 
2.2 Psychological concept of fairness 
In the psychological literature ‘equitable’, ‘just’ and ‘fair’ are used interchangeably. Psycho-
logical research distinguishes three types of fairness; distributive, procedural and restorative 
justice (Gilovich, Keltner, & Nisbett, 2006). Distributive justice refers to the fairness of out-
comes and procedural justice to the fairness of the process by which outcomes are distributed. 
Actions meant to restore justice are termed restorative justice. ;e three types will be ex-
plained in more detail in the following. 
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2.2.1 Distributive justice 
;ere are three principles of distributive justice determining how resources should be allo-
cated (Gilovich et al., 2006). One possibility for a fair distribution is to base the decision on 
people’s contributions; this is called the equity principle. According to this principle out-
comes should match inputs. ;us people who contribute more deserve to receive more as 
well. In the example in the introduction this principle corresponds to option B (Figure 1); the 
one who made the cake and the one whose birthday it is deserve more than the others. ;is 
principle is preferred by people with power and/or wealth, because it makes justiFcation for 
their resources easier (Cook & Hegtvedt, 1896). Equality, the second principle, in contrast is 
based on the idea that all people contributing to an outcome should receive the same. Option 
A from the example in the introduction corresponds to this principle (Figure 1); everyone 
receives an equally large piece of cake. ;is principle is very common in team sports; all team 
members receive the same prize when winning a tournament independent of their individual 
performance. Finally, resources can be distributed in a way that they match people’s needs, 
allocating most to those with the greatest need. ;is principle is called principle of need and 
is most common in families (Gilovich et al., 2006). ;e principle of need corresponds to op-
tion C of the example in the introduction (Figure 1).  
2.2.2 Procedural justice 
Distributive justice is not the only factor people base their fairness judgments on. In addition 
to the Fnal outcome people have a concern for the allocation process itself (Brockner & 
Wiesenfeld, 1996; Folger, 1977; Tyler, 1989). Questions like, ‘Who distributes the resource 
and why?’ or ‘Who else is involved in the distribution process?’ do have an inTuence on fair-
ness judgments as well. Procedural justice is mostly used in the context of authorities, assum-
ing that some authority decides how to distribute resources (Gilovich et al., 2006). According 
to Tyler (1989) there are three factors shaping our judgment of procedural justice: neutrality, 
trust and standing. Standing refers to the status information transmitted by the allocator. Po-
liteness, respect and dignity can for example be communicated in a distribution process. 
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Trust involves beliefs about the intention and neutrality, the honesty and unbiased view of 
the allocator. ;ese three factors have an independent impact on judgments about procedural 
justice (Tyler, 1989).  
2.2.3 Restorative justice 
As long as people stick to the principles of distributive and procedural justice, a belief in a 
just world is maintained. A belief in a just world is the conviction that people get what they 
deserve (Furnham, 2003; Lerner & Miller, 1978). Injustice threatens this belief and motivates 
restorative actions (Greenberg, 1986; Hafer & Olson, 1993). ;ere are di>erent possibilities 
to restore justice; the most prevalent are punishment and reconciliation (Gilovich et al., 
2006). Punishment of injustice can have two aims, either to revenge or to prevent future in-
justice (Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002). ;e former is called retributive punishment 
and the latter utilitarian punishment. Retributive punishment is inTuenced by emotions, 
whereas utilitarian punishment is more associated with cognitive processes  (Harmon-Jones, 
Sigelman, Bohlig, & Harmon-Jones, 2003; Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998). Apologies and 
forgiveness are two components of reconciliation. Apologies promote forgiveness; aGer an 
apology people are more likely to forgive the perpetrator of injustice (Abeler, Calaki, Andree, 
& Basek, 2010; Fischbacher & Utikal, 2010; Strang et al., 2014; for more detail see Part II. 3,4). 
However, not every transgression is forgiven aGer an apology, the intention behind the trans-
gression matters. Apologies only promote forgiveness aGer transgressions committed unin-
tentionally (Fischbacher & Utikal, 2010). Forgiveness is associated with decreased negative 
emotions, and increased empathy towards the perpetrator and it is an important factor in 
restoring justice (McCullough, Sandage, & Worthington, 1997; Strang et al., 2014; Walster et 
al., 1973). 
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2.2.4 Equity theory 
;ere are di>erent psychological models about why people behave fairly and why they value 
fair behavior of others (Folger, 1977; Tyler, 1994). For approximately 40 years, the dominant 
psychological model of fairness has been equity theory (Walster et al., 1973). Equity theory 
predominantly focuses on distributional justice. Like most economic models equity theory is 
also based on the assumption that people are selFsh and try to maximize their outcomes. 
However, an additional assumption of equity theory is that groups maximize their collective 
outcome by allocating outcomes equitably to group members. To make equitable behavior of 
individuals proFtable it will be rewarded, whereas inequitable behavior will be punished by 
the group. ;us people behave in an equitable way as long as they proFt from it. According 
to equity theory an equitable distribution is one that has identical relative outcomes (Walster 
et al., 1973). ;us, it is not the total outcome but the ratio of total outcomes and inputs that 
matters. Inputs are people’s contributions to an outcome. ;is implies that two people who 
invest di>erently in an exchange receive di>erent total outcomes, and still this distribution is 
equitable. ;us, allocating resources according to equity theory follows a similar principle as 
the equity principle of distributive justice (see section “Distributive justice”). ;e values at-
tached to inputs and outputs are determined by the social norms of a society, therefore equi-
tability is not a uniform concept but di>ers between societies. 
2.2.5 Relational model of justice 
Another psychological model of justice is the relational model (Tyler, 1994). In contrast to 
equity theory the relational model is focused on procedural justice. ;e relational model of 
justice links a concern for social bonds and status with the concern about justice. ;e main 
assumption of this model is that people are predisposed to be a member of a social group and 
that they try to maintain and improve social status within that group. People seek to become 
and stay a member of a social group because membership provides a source of self-validation 
(Festinger, 1954). Being accepted by their social group is rewarding whereas being rejected is 
a form of punishment for most people. ;erefore people are constantly concerned about their 
14 Part I 
position in their group. Procedural justice does contain information about this position. As 
mentioned above the distribution process transfers information about neutrality, trust and 
standing (Tyler, 1989). All three factors provide group-membership information and are 
therefore of importance to people of the group. 
3 Neuroscience and Fairness 
As already mentioned in the Introduction, the Frst insights about brain areas that are in-
volved in adherence to social norms and fairness in particular came from patients with 
frontal lobe injuries (Damasio et al., 1990; Harlow, 1993; Rudebeck et al., 2008). Patients with 
ventromedial prefrontal lobe damage show for example higher rejection rates for unfair o>ers 
in the Ultimatum Game, suggesting that they have an altered perception of fairness (Koenigs 
& Tranel, 2007). Nowadays neuroscience o>ers a variety of methods to investigate the under-
lying mechanisms of fairness in healthy participants. NeuroscientiFc studies on fairness can 
be grouped into three main categories: genetic studies, hormone studies and neuroimag-
ing/stimulation studies. Since the structure and function of our brain is determined largely 
by our genes, investigating the relation between genes and fair behavior provides useful in-
sight into the processes underlying fairness (Glahn, ;ompson, & Blangero, 2007; Walter, 
Markett, Montag, & Reuter, 2011). Another determinant of these processes are hormones 
which have a huge impact on our behavior as well, therefore understanding the impact cer-
tain hormones have on fairness improves our understanding of the underlying processes as 
well (De Dreu, 2012).   
However, in this dissertation I will focus on the third category: neuroimaging and stim-
ulation studies. ;anks to new methods in neuroimaging it is nowadays possible to investi-
gate the involvement of a given brain area in fairness in healthy participants. Two frequently 
used neuroscientiFc methods are functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and tran-
scranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). Both methods will be explained in the following. 
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3.1 Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) is a neuroscientiFc method which creates 
images of brain activity. It does so by measuring changes in blood oxygenation that occur in 
response to neuronal activity; the so called blood oxygenation level dependent signal (BOLD 
signal).  
3.1.1 The BOLD signal 
Increased local neuronal activity Frst leads to an increased oxygen extraction and thereby to 
an increased relative deoxygenated blood concentration (Huettel, Song, & McCarthy, 2009). 
;is fast response to neuronal activity is called initial dip. AGer the Frst short-time deoxy-
genation, increased local neuronal activity causes a boost in local blood Tow and results in 
an oversupply of oxygenated blood. ;is response to the increased energy demand has a time-
lag of 4-8 seconds and is called blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) hemodynamic 
response (see Figure 4). Oxygenated and deoxygenated hemoglobin have di>erent magnetic 
properties. While oxygenated blood is diamagnetic, deoxygenated hemoglobin is paramag-
netic. Paramagnetic deoxygenated blood creates magnetic Feld distortions, whereas diamag-
netic oxygenated blood leads to a more homogeneous local magnetic Feld (Huettel et al., 
2009). It is this associated change in magnetic Feld homogeneity that serves as a marker for 
neural activity.  
 
Figure 4. Schematic illustration of  the blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) sig-
nal. (Adapted from Kornak, Hall, & Haggard, 2011) 
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Neuronal activity results in a BOLD signal increase of about 1% to 5% (Huettel et al., 2009), 
this signal is masked by physical and physiological noise. Henceforth, in order to detect stim-
ulus related e>ects an appropriate preprocessing and data analysis needs to be performed. 
3.1.2 Preprocessing 
A series of computational processes in order to remove artifacts is typically performed prior 
to the statistical analysis. ;ese standard preprocessing steps are: motion correction, slice 
time correction, normalization, as well as temporal and spatial Fltering. 
FMRI data quality is strongly inTuenced by head movements. As a rule of thumb data 
sets with head movements exceeding 3 mm or 2.5° should be removed. Motion correction 
upon smaller head movements can substantially improve data quality. For motion correction 
one functional image is used as a reference to which all the other images are aligned. Head 
movements can be described by three translation (movements along the x, y and z-axes) and 
three rotation parameters (rotation around x, y and z-axes). ;ese parameters are estimated 
by analyzing how an image has to be translated and rotated to better align with the reference 
image. ;e process stops when no further improvement can be achieved. ;e Fnal movement 
parameters are then applied to the source image to produce a new image replacing the origi-
nal one. ;e obtained parameters can also be integrated as an additional regressors in the 
subsequent data analysis. A perfect motion correction would results in a di>erence of zero 
with regard to the voxel by voxel subtraction from reference and source image. 
In fMRI data analysis we treat one functional volume as a data set obtained at one certain 
time point. However, the slices of one functional volume are scanned sequentially and there-
fore distributed over time. Usually, 30 slices can be acquired within 3s (Huettel et al., 2009). 
;is means, that the last slice is measured 3s later than the Frst slice. ;e aim of slice time 
correction is to preprocess the data in a way that the obtained data can be treated as if all 
slices were obtained at the same moment in time. For this purpose the time series of individ-
ual slices are shiGed to match a reference time point. ;e choice of the reference slice depends 
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on the stimulation protocol, in which slice acquisition can be ascending, descending or in-
terleaved. Since the temporal shiG of the slices leads to sampling at time points falling be-
tween measurement time points, the new values are estimated by interpolation. AGer suc-
cessful slice time correction all slices within one functional volume represent the same time 
point (Huettel et al., 2009).  
AGer motion correction and slice time correction, brain activity can be localized in time 
and space within a single participant (Frst level). ;e goal of most social neuroscience studies 
is, however, to analyze data at the group level (second level). Since brains can vary substan-
tially in size and shape, individual data must be normalized in order to compare it across 
participants (Huettel et al., 2009). ;is process starts out by Frst determining the overall size 
and raw anatomic landmarks of the brain and then continues by stretching, squeezing, and 
warping the individual images mathematically so that brain shape and size are the same for 
all participants. ;is is done by transforming data into a common stereotaxic space, of which 
the most common ones are the Talairach and MNI space (Huettel et al., 2009).  
Finally, the data is temporally and spatially Fltered to remove artifacts. ;e Flter choice 
depends on what kind of artifacts one desires to remove. High-pass temporal Flters are com-
monly used to remove changes of very low frequency that are caused by the scanner. De-
pending on the paradigm additional Flters can be used to remove artifacts due to heart rate, 
respiration etc. Furthermore the data can be spatially Fltered to remove high frequency spa-
tial components. ;is can be done by convolving the data with a 3D Gaussian kernel. Each 
voxel is then replaced by a weighted value calculated across neighboring voxels. Shape and 
width of the kernel determine the weights used to include adjacent voxels.  
To sum up, preprocessing can substantially enhance data quality. However, there are no 
universally accepted criteria for preprocessing. ;e exact preprocessing steps and parameters 
rather depend on the paradigm and the subsequent analysis.  
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3.1.3 First level analysis 
;e objective of fMRI data analysis is, in its simplest form, to identify brain regions that show 
di>erential response to two di>erent conditions (mostly control versus experimental condi-
tion). ;us, the null hypothesis (H0) states that there is no di>erence in activation between 
two conditions, whereas the alternative hypothesis (H1) states that there is a di>erence. In 
standard, univariate, fMRI analysis this is tested independently for the time course of each 
voxel resulting in one statistical value per voxel per participant.  
fMRI analysis is usually performed in two steps: Frst and second level analysis. In the Frst 
level analysis di>erential activations within one participant are computed. ;e most fre-
quently used Frst level approach is the general linear model (GLM). ;e GLM predicts the 
variation of the observed BOLD time course in terms of a linear combination of several re-
gressors (also called predictors or explanatory variables). All regressors are convolved with 
the hemodynamic response function (see Figure 4.). β-weights deFne the contribution of 
each regressor. It is these β-weights that are estimated in the fMRI analysis. In order to test 
whether two conditions di>er from each other a contrast needs to be calculated. ;e null 
hypothesis of this test states that the β values of two regressors do no not di>er. Depending 
on the number of regressors a t or an F test can be used. 
3.1.4 Second level analysis 
In order to test whether the results are generalizable at population level a random e>ects 
analysis is used. ;e obtained contrasts from the Frst level analysis per subject are therefore 
transferred to the second level analysis. In the second level analysis a one sample t-test (in 
case of one group) is used to determine whether results are signiFcantly di>erent from zero.  
One problem of fMRI analysis is the huge number of voxels and the corresponding num-
ber of statistical tests. If you had data of only one voxel you could use a conventional signiF-
cant threshold of 0.05. However, having thousands of statistical tests performed simultane-
ously, fMRI analysis has a multiple comparison problem resulting in false positives (Type I 
Error). ;ere are di>erent methods which can be used to correct for the multiple comparison 
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problem, with the simplest one being the Bonferroni correction. ;is correction adjusts the 
single-voxel threshold in such a way that an error probability of 0.05 at the global level is 
retained. ;us, with N independent statistical tests, a statistical signiFcance level which is N 
times smaller than usual is used. Since this correction controls the false positives across all 
voxels, it is also called family-wise error correction (FWE-corr.). 
3.2 Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation  
FMRI is an excellent method for investigating correlations between brain activity and a 
certain task. However, it does not allow any conclusions about the causal involvement of the 
brain region found to be activated. Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) in contrast per-
mits establishing causality. TMS stimulates the brain through the skull without causing any 
pain. It works based on Faraday’s law of electromagnetic induction: a change in a magnet 
Feld induces an electrical current in a wire located in this magnetic Feld. A brief electrical 
current passes through the TMS coil producing a strong magnetic Feld. Via rapid changes 
the magnetic Feld induces, as predicted by Faraday’s law, an electrical current. Holding the 
TMS coil close to the skull the magnetic Feld passes the skull without causing pain and in-
duces an electrical current in the underlying brain area. ;e induced electrical current is 
thought to activate neurons in the cortex (see Figure 5). Using single-pulse TMS, the stimu-
lation induces neuronal activity di>erent from the activity produced naturally. It therefore 
induces noise to the ongoing neuronal process (Pascual-Leone, Walsh, & Rothwell, 2000; 
Walsh & Cowey, 2000). With single-pulse TMS brain activation can be disrupted transiently 
and this makes it possible to assess the causal involvement on a millisecond scale (Hamilton 
& Pascual-Leone, 1998).  
It is important to distinguish between single pulse/event-related and repetitive o]ine 
TMS (rTMS) protocols. rTMS induces aGer-e>ects. ;e duration of these aGer e>ects de-
pends on the stimulation frequency and intensity. In general frequencies smaller than 1 Hz 
decrease cortical excitability, whereas frequencies higher than 5 Hz increase it (Sack, 2006). 
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A rather new stimulation protocol is theta-burst stimulation (TBS); here short bursts of three 
50 Hz pulses are applied. With TBS protocols it is possible to create aGere>ects of more than 
60 min duration (Huang, Edwards, Rounis, Bhatia, & Rothwell, 2005).  
In order to investigate cognitive processes TMS can be used as a complementary ap-
proach to fMRI. TMS can probe whether task correlated brain activity found in fMRI studies 
is necessary for successful performance of the task. To this end, individual or group func-
tional coordinates are used as TMS target sites. Using this approach it was shown that regions 
showing task correlated activity are not necessary for task performance (Knoch, Pascual-Le-
one, Meyer, Treyer, & Fehr, 2006; Sanfey et al., 2003). TMS localization based on fMRI data 
outperforms other localization methods (MRI guided TMS and 10-20 EEG position guided 
TMS) by yielding higher e>ect sizes (Sack et al., 2009). Furthermore TMS can be combined 
with fMRI. Using a combination of both methods, the involvement of a given brain region in 
a network can be investigated (Baumgartner, Knoch, Hotz, Eisenegger, & Fehr, 2011). ;e 
methods can be combined online (simultaneously) or o]ine (subsequently, using the rTMS 
aGer-e>ects). A combination with o]ine rTMS is easier since no fMRI compatible TMS 
equipment is needed. ;e participant is stimulated before the fMRi session and changes due 
to the TMS aGer-e>ects are investigated.  
 
 
Figure 5. Basic principles of  transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). The current 
in the TMS coil generates a changing magnetic field that induces an electric field 
in the brain (Adapted from Ruohonen & Ilmoniemi, 2002). 
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3.2.1 Possible confounds 
Since cortical excitability varies across participants (Stewart, Walsh, & Rothwell, 2001), TMS 
stimulation intensity should be adjusted at the beginning of a TMS experiment. ;e standard 
is that participant’s motor threshold (MT) is determined and used as an index of cortical 
excitability. In most TMS studies MT is measured as the minimum stimulation intensity 
needed to produce a muscle movement in the right index Fnger when stimulating the leG 
motor cortex. In case that the muscles controlling the index Fnger are relaxed (Fnger rests on 
table) during stimulation it is called resting MT, in case that the muscles controlling the index 
Fnger are tensed (Fnger stretched out) it is called active MT. Both MTs are used in cognitive 
research. Stimulator output during the actual TMS paradigm is then adjusted to the MT. By 
using multiples of the MTs stimulation intensity can be normalized across subjects. However, 
there is no broad agreement on what percentage of the MT should be used for TMS stimula-
tion the magnitudes range from 90% to 110% of the MT (Robertson, ;éoret, & Pascual-
Leone, 2003). 
TMS is commonly described as noninvasive and painless. However depending on the 
target site TMS can cause sensory sensations that might interfere with task performance. Es-
pecially at frontal, temporal and occipital regions TMS can induce muscle activation. Fur-
thermore the TMS stimulator produces a loud clicking noise. ;ere are several approaches 
used to minimize the inTuence of these confounds to ensure that changes in task perfor-
mance are speciFcally due to TMS stimulation.  
One approach is to use di>erent control stimulation sites. If the TMS e>ect is only ob-
served at one speciFc site, the di>erence between sites is most likely due to the TMS e>ect. 
;e bilateral site and the Vertex are oGen used as control sites. For unilateral processes the 
contralateral site is a good control site because the sensory e>ects are very similar. An alter-
native approach is to use sham TMS. ;e auditory clicking sound of a sham coil is identical 
to a normal TMS coil; however, no magnetic Feld is produced. Using repetitive TMS elegantly 
removes potential sensory confounds, since participants perform the task in the o]ine TMS 
period, thus not during stimulation. 
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3.3 The neural basis of fairness 
In order to investigate the neural basis of fairness and other decision making phenomena 
behavioral paradigms from economics were combined with neuroscientiFc techniques. ;is 
interdisciplinary research Feld is called neuroeconomics. ;e aim of neuroeconomics is to 
gain further insights into the neural mechanisms underlying decision making in economic 
and social contexts. Although this Feld is still quite young the number of publications in-
creased exponentially during the last years (see Figure 6). A deeper understanding of the 
neural basis of fairness went along with this boost of publications. Researchers have tried to 
Fnd neural evidence for psychological as well as economic concepts described in the sections 
“Economic concept of fairness” and “Psychological concept of fairness” by using the methods 
explained in the section “Functional magnetic resonance imaging” and Transcranial mag-
netic stimulation” by using the methods described in “Functional Magnetic Imaging” and 
“Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation”. In the following some of these studies will be described 
and discussed. 
 
Figure 6. Increase in number of  publications in Neuroeconomics using “decision 
making” and “brain” as search criteria in PubMed (November, 2014). 
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3.3.1 The neural basis of decision making in the Ultimatum Game 
3.3.1.1 Unfairness 
In 2003 Sanfey and colleagues were the Frsts to investigate the neural mechanisms underlying 
decision making in the Ultimatum Game (Sanfey et al., 2003). ;eir aim was to test whether 
rejections are driven by cognitive or emotional processes and thereby to disentangle a still 
ongoing debate about the motives to reject unfair o>ers (see section “Emotions” for further 
details). Participants were receivers in the Ultimatum Game, they played either with a com-
puter or with a human partner. Half of the o>ers participants received were fair (even split); 
the other half was unfair (less than 50%). ;e anterior insula (AI), dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) were more activated when participants 
received unfair compared to fair o>ers from human partners (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Activity related to unfair versus fair offers in the UG in the human condi-
tion (adapted from Sanfey et al., 2003)  
;ese areas were more strongly activated by human than by computer o>ers, indicating 
that activation is not only a function of the amount of money. ;us, the social context, the 
unfair treatment of a human partner, evokes activity in AI, DLPFC and ACC. Activity in the 
AI was further sensitive to unfairness, showing increased activity the more unfair the o>ers 
were. It also correlated with rejection rates. ;us, higher activity was related to higher rejec-
tion rates. Since the insula is known to be involved in negative emotions (Evans et al., 2002; 
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Hein, Silani, Preuscho>, Batson, & Singer, 2010) activation in this study might reTect a neg-
ative emotional response to unfairness. ;is interpretation supports the theory that emo-
tional motives drive the decision to reject unfair o>ers. ACC is known to be involved in con-
Tict monitoring and might encode the conTict between selFsh impulses and the emotional 
impulse to reject. Activity in the DLPFC was not sensitive to the degree of unfairness. Its 
higher activation for unfair compared to fair o>ers can have several reasons. ;e exact in-
volvement of the DLPFC in the Ultimatum Game could not be disentangled in the study by 
Sanfey et al. (2003). 
In order to get a better understanding of the role of the DLPFC in the decision process as 
a receiver in the Ultimatum Game two research groups conducted similar TMS experiments 
(Knoch et al., 2006; Van't Wout, Kahn, Sanfey, & Aleman, 2005). Knoch et al. (2006) wanted 
to test two di>erent hypotheses about the role of the DLPFC. According to them the DLPFC 
can either be involved in controlling selFsh or fairness impulses. ;e former means that the 
DLPFC overrides selFsh impulses in order to implement fair behavior. ;us, when the 
DLPFC is disrupted selFsh impulses should have a stronger impact on participant’s decisions 
leading to lower rejection rates. According to the second hypothesis fairness impulses should 
dominate behavior and rejection rates should increase when TMS is applied over the DLPFC. 
Both Knoch et al. (2006) and Van’t Wout et al. (2005) found evidence for the Frst hypothesis; 
TMS stimulation over the right but not leG DLPFC decreased rejection rates. SelFsh impulses 
cannot be controlled anymore and participants attach greater importance on maximizing 
their payo>s. Participants were further asked to judge the fairness of the o>ers. Interestingly 
fairness jugdments did not di>er across TMS conditions. ;us, participants knew that the 
received o>ers were unfair, but still accepted them in the right DLPFC TMS condition.  
;ese results were replicated with another brain stimulation method: transcranial direct 
current stimulation (tDCS; Knoch et al., 2008). Cathodal tDCS stimulation increased ac-
ceptance rates of unfair o>ers, while not a>ecting fairness judgments. 
To sum up, ACC, AI and DLPFC show higher activation for unfair compared to fair o>ers 
(Sanfey et al., 2003). AI probably encodes the negative emotional response to unfair o>ers 
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and ACC monitors the conTict between this emotional response and the selFsh impulse to 
take the money. Further Knoch et al. (2006) and Van’t Wout et al. (2005) showed that the 
right DLPFC seems to be involved in overriding selFsh impulses.  
However, the exact role of this network of regions and the connectivity within this net-
work cannot be investigated with fMRI or TMS alone. Baumgartner et al. (2011) combined 
the two methods in order to investigate the causal e>ect of TMS on task related activity in 
the stimulated brain area (DLPFC) and on the connectivity between DLPFC, AI and ACC. 
;ey used the same TMS protocol and paradigm as Knoch et al. (2006) but during the TMS 
aGer-e>ect period participants lay in the scanner while playing the Ultimatum Game. ;ey 
found that Frst, the right DLPFC was not activated by unfair o>ers when it was disrupted by 
TMS. ;ere was no e>ect of leG DLPFC TMS on activation of the leG or right DLPFC. Sec-
ond, TMS of the right DLPFC but not the leG DLPFC decreased activity in the posterior 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (pVMPFC). ;is e>ect was speciFc to unfair o>ers; for fair 
o>ers no di>erential activation in the pVMPFC due to right DLPFC TMS could be observed. 
Further analysis revealed that the connectivity strength between right DLPFC and pVMPFC 
correlated with individual rejection rates. Interestingly no di>erences in activation were ob-
served in AI and ACC.  
;e results from Baumgartner et al. (2011) suggest that there are no top-down or bottom-
up inTuences between DLPFC, ACC and IA. Although this result may seem surprising at 
Frst, the absence of a TMS e>ect on AI and ACC can explain why the fairness judgments of 
participants are una>ected when the right DLPFC is disrupted. ;us, while both AI and ACC 
might be involved in fairness attribution and fairness judgments, they are not causally in-
volved in the behavioral change caused by TMS. DLPFC in contrast and its connectivity to 
the pVMPFC was shown to be causally involved in behavioral changes. pVMPFC is associ-
ated with computing decision values (Smith et al., 2010). In the context of the Ultimatum 
Game pVPMFC might encode the decision value of rejecting an o>er and this computation 
might be regulated through communication with the right DLPFC in case of an unfair o>er.  
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;ese three studies demonstrate the advantages of TMS and its combination with fMRI 
for gaining a better understanding of the role of a certain brain region or a network of brain 
regions in a given cognitive process. First, the TMS results by Knoch et al. (2006) and  Van’t 
Wout et al. (2005) allow for statements about a causal involvement of the right DLPFC in the 
decision making process and support the hypothesis that it is involved in controlling selFsh 
impulses. Second, they could show that, although both leG and right DLPFC activation are 
correlated with unfair o>ers, only the right DLPFC is causally involved in the decision to 
accept or reject. ;ird, by combining TMS and fMRI Baumgartner et al. (2011) demonstrated 
that the communication between the right DLPFC and pVMPFC is important for making 
fairness-norm compliant decisions (rejecting unfair o>ers). And Fnally, they could 
demonstrate that although IA, ACC and DLPFC are activated by unfair o>ers, only the right 
DLPFC is causally involved in the decision to reject unfair o>ers and thereby implementing 
fairness norms. 
3.3.1.2 Fairness 
A lot of research has been conducted on unfairness (unfair o>ers) in the Ultimatum Game 
and its neural correlates (Knoch et al., 2006; Sanfey et al., 2003; Van't Wout et al., 2005). Ta-
bibnia and colleagues in contrast investigated the underlying neural process of being treated 
fairly (fair o>ers; Tabibnia, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2008). Since fair o>ers in the Ultimatum 
Game always go along with higher monetary payo>s for the receiver, it is diHcult to disen-
tangle these two factors. Tabibnia et al. (2008) controlled for the potential confound of higher 
monetary payo>s by varying the proposer’s endowment across trials. In this way the same 
o>er can be a fair o>er with a small endowment ($5 out of $10) and an unfair o>er with a 
larger endowment ($5 out of 20$). A di>erence in brain activation between these two trials 
can thus only be attributed to fairness concerns. Participants had the role of the receiver and 
lay in the scanner while seeing the o>ers and deciding to reject or accept. Additionally par-
ticipants were asked to rate how happy they felt in response to each o>er.  
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;eir results indicate that happiness correlates positively with fairness. Moreover they 
found that fair compared to unfair o>ers elicited activity in the ventral striatum, the amyg-
dala, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and mid-
brain regions.  
Consistent with Sanfey et al. (2003) they found that the insula was activated during unfair 
trials that were rejected. ;e ventral striatum and the VMPFC are known to be involved in 
reward processing. ;erefore the authors suggest that fairness is rewarding. ;is interpreta-
tion is in line with the idea that humans value fairness and that they have a predisposition for 
it (see the section “Fair-share hypothesis and expectation hypothesis of fairness” for more 
details). 
3.3.2 Procedural and distributive justice – Two different brain 
processes? 
In the psychological literature fairness is subdivided in procedural and distributive justice 
(for more details see the section “Distributive justice” and “Procedural justice”). However, 
whether people really distinguish between these two types of fairness could not fully be an-
swered by purely behavioral paradigms. Dulebohn and colleagues conducted an fMRI study 
to test whether the two types of fairness involve di>erent neural processes (Dulebohn et al., 
2009). ;eir participants lay in the scanner while playing the Ultimatum Game. Before each 
o>er in the Ultimatum Game participants had to solve three math problems. ;ey were told 
that the participant who solved more problems correctly got the role of the proposer. Proce-
dural justice was manipulated by sometimes violating this rule in di>erent ways and assigning 
the participant the role of the receiver although he or she should be the dictator. Participants 
were for example told that they gave a wrong response although the problem was easy and 
actually correctly solved. Only those trials in which participants were receivers were used for 
the analysis. Distributive justice was manipulated via the o>ers participants receive; 40% and 
50% of the proposer’s endowment was coded as fair and 10% and 20% as unfair.  
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;eir results indicate that distributive injustice recruits di>erent brain areas compared to 
procedural justice. ;e dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC) and anterior insular (AI) are more activated by distributive unfairness, whereas the 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) and the superior temporal sulcus (STS) are more 
activated by procedural unfairness. ;e former result is in line with the results of Sanfey et 
al. (2003) and Tabibnia et al. (2008) who also found the AI, DLPFC and ACC to be activated 
by unfair o>ers in the Ultimatum Game. According to the authors their Fndings show that 
procedural and distributive unfairness evoke di>erent processes; distributive injustice 
recruits emotion related brain areas while procedural injustice recruits areas known to be 
involved in social cognition (Dulebohn et al., 2009).  
;us, the results support the psychological concept of two distinct types of fairness and 
additionally reveal that the two di>erent types can be linked to di>erent brain processes, 
namely cognitive and emotional processes respectively. 
3.3.3 Neural correlates of Equity and Efficiency 
As discussed in the section “Distributive justice” there are several principles according to 
which resources can be distributed in a fair way. According to the principle of equality, re-
sources should be distributed equally, meaning that everyone gets the same amount inde-
pendent of their contribution (Gilovich et al., 2006). Economists sometimes use the term 
equity (although it has a di>erent meaning in psychology; see the section ‘Distributive jus-
tice’) for the psychological principle of equality. ;ey further distinguish equity from another 
principle, eHciency. Hsu, Anen and Quartz (2008) use the following example to illustrate the 
di>erence between the two principles of equity and eHciency: Imagine that there is a truck 
with fresh food driving to a famine-stricken region. Since it takes a long time to reach every-
one, 20% of the food would spoil before everyone receives the same amount of food (equity 
principle). If the truck driver delivered food only to half of the people, only 5% would spoil 
(eHciency principle; Hsu et al., 2008). Distributing resources according to the eHciency prin-
ciple means maximizing the overall good/the sum of individual payo>s, whereas distributing 
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resources according to the equity principle means allocating resources equally even if this 
might decrease the overall good. 
In order to test whether these two principles have di>erent neural correlates a new para-
digm was used (Hsu et al., 2008). Participants made decisions about how to allocate meals 
between three children from northern Uganda. In each trial di>erent children were presented 
and every child had 24 meals as an endowment. Participants received two options about 
whom to take away some of the meals. For example they had to decide to either taking away 
0 meals from child one, 11 meals from child two and 11 meals from child three or taking 
away 23 meals from child one, 0 meals from child two and 0 from child three. Someone who 
prefers equity would probably choose the Frst option (allocating resources as equal as possi-
ble), whereas someone preferring eHciency would choose the second option (maximizing 
overall good). Hsu et al. (2008) used an inequity aversion model to estimate individual pa-
rameters for eHciency and equity. EHciency was measured by the total number of meals in 
each option. Equity was measured by the di>erence between meals.  
;eir results show that the activity in the putamen correlated with the eHciency param-
eter, whereas the activity in the insula correlated with the inequity parameter. Furthermore, 
both parameters correlate with activity in the caudate nucleus. ;ese results suggest that the 
two di>erent fairness principles, eHciency and equity, are coded in di>erent brain regions, 
insula and putamen, and that information about both principles is combined in the caudate 
nucleus. ;us, the psychological and economic division of fairness in di>erent subprinciples 
could be demonstrated on a neural level as well. 
3.3.4 Intentions matter – for our brain as well? 
Falk and Fischbacher (2003) suggest that the perception of fairness is inTuenced by inten-
tionality (see the section “Intentions” for further information). Objectively identical o>ers 
are rejected when the intention of the proposer was negative (i.e. when a fair alternative was 
available, but he chose the unfair one). Güroğlu and colleagues tested whether di>erent brain 
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areas are involved in processing intentionally unfair o>ers compared to unintentionally un-
fair o>ers (Güroğlu et al., 2010). ;ey used a similar task as Falk and Fischbacher (2003): 
three Mini-Ultimatum Games with two choice options each. One option was always 80% for 
the proposer and 20% for the receiver and the other one was 50%/50% (fair alternative), 
20%/80% (hyperfair alternative) or 80%/20% (no alternative). In both fair alternative and 
hyperfair alternative conditions the intention of the proposer behind an unfair o>er is clear; 
he or she wants to maximize his or her own payo>s. In the no alternative condition on the 
contrary intentions are rather ambiguous; the receiver cannot be sure whether the proposer 
was intentionally or unintentionally fair.  
;eir results indicated that activity in the insula, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and 
temporo parietal junction (TPJ) were inTuenced by intentionality. ;e insula showed higher 
activity when receivers rejected unfair o>ers in the no-alternative condition and when they 
accepted unfair o>ers in the two fair-alternative and hyperfair-alternative conditions. In the 
no-alternative condition accepting the unfair o>er might be the social norm whereas in the 
other two fair-alternative and hyperfair-alternative condition rejecting is the social norm. 
;e authors suggest that increased insula activity reTects social norms violations. ;ese re-
sults extend the previously described neuroimaging results by Hsu, Anen, & Quartz (2008), 
Sanfey et al. (2003), Dulebohn et al. (2009) and Tabibnia et al. (2008) who suggested that the 
insula has a general role in inequity aversion. However, if the insula were involved in inequity 
aversion, it should be most active when participants reject unfair o>ers in the fair alternative 
condition. ;e results in contrast are rather in line with error signals due to social norm vio-
lations (Montague & Lohrenz, 2007) since activity is higher when social norms are violated. 
Hence, according to these results the insula is rather involved in detecting error signals than 
inequity.  
;e TPJ was more activated when unfair o>ers were rejected in the no-alternative condi-
tion compared to the other two conditions. ;us, TPJ activity was speciFc to the uninten-
tional condition. Since the TPJ is known to be involved in mentalizing, activity in this para-
digm probably reTects mentalizing about the intentions of the proposer. In both the fair-
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alternative and the hyperfair-alternative condition the intentions of the proposer are clear; 
only the no-alternative condition requires thinking about intentionality and therefore re-
cruits TPJ. 
In summary, Güroğlu and colleages could Frst of all replicate the Fndings of Falk and 
Fischbacher (2003) by showing that decision-making on the receiver’s side in the Ultimatum 
Game is modulated by intentionality and second, demonstrate that di>erential brain activity 
can be associated with rejecting intentionally and unintentionally (ambigious) unfair o>ers. 
;ey thereby emphasize the importance of intentions in the assessment of fairness in the 
Ultimatum Game. 
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1 Introduction 
In the second part of my dissertation I present three studies on fairness using di>erent para-
digms and methods. In all three studies fairness is deFned according to the psychological 
principle of equality (‘equity’ in the economics literature). In the context of the bargaining 
games used in these experiments, this means an equal split for both players; unequal splits 
are regarded as unfair. In the Frst study the causal involvement of the right DPLFC in strategic 
fairness is investigated using TMS. ;e second study is an fMRI study exploring the neural 
basis of forgiving unfair behavior and receiving an apology. ;e third study investigates the 
neural correlates of fairness norm maintenance. And Fnally, in the last study a purely behav-
ioral paradigm is used and the e>ect of di>erent emotion regulation strategies on negative 
emotions aGer being treated unfairly is tested.  
2 Study 1: Right DLPFC plays a causal role in 
strategic fairness 
Published in Sabrina Strang, Jörg Gross, Teresa Schuhmann, Arno Riedl, Bernd Weber 
and Alexander T. Sack (2015). Be nice if you have to – ;e neurbiological roots of strate-
gic fairness. Social Cognitive and Aective Neuroscience, 10, 790-796. 
As described in the section “Maintenance of social norms” the maintenance of social norms 
oGen depends on external enforcement. ;is means that people show increased fair behavior 
when they are afraid that they will get punished for unfair behavior (Ernst Fehr & Gächter, 
2002; Gächter et al., 2008; Ule et al., 2009). ;ese results suggest that humans are able to 
strategically adapt their behavior, i.e. acting selFshly when sanctioning is not possible and 
acting fairly when they have to. One prerequisite for fair behavior is the control of selFsh 
impulses. ;e right DLPFC was shown to be involved in controlling selFsh impulses when 
there is a conTict between selFsh impulses and norm compliant fair behavior (Baumgartner 
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et al., 2011; Knoch et al., 2006; Van't Wout et al., 2005; see section ";e neural basis of decision 
making in the Ultimatum Game" for more details). In this study we investigated whether the 
right DLPFC is involved in the strategic acquisition of this control mechanism. We hypothe-
sized that disruption of the right DLPFC decreases people’s ability to act in a strategically fair 
way.   
We used two di>erent types of the Dictator Games in order to measure the TMS e>ect on 
strategic fairness, a classical Dictator Game and a Dictator Game with punishment option 
(similar to the Ultimatum Game). In the latter, receivers had the possibility to punish dicta-
tors by subtracting part of the dictator’s payo>s. ;is punishment was costly for the receivers, 
meaning that they had to invest their own money for punishing the dictator. In the classical 
Dictator Game, dictators do not face any punishment threat; in the Dictator Game with pun-
ishment threat dictators should adapt their behavior by making higher transfers. We used the 
di>erence in transfers between the two games as an index for strategic adaptation. Seventeen 
male participants were invited to three TMS session (leG DLPFC TMS, right DLPFC TMS 
and sham TMS) and played the role of the dictator in the two di>erent Dictator Games. Par-
ticipants received no direct feedback during the sessions and sessions were separated by at 
least one week. AGer the last session participants received the responses of the receivers and 
both dictator and receiver were paid according to one randomly selected trial per session. In 
addition to playing the Dictator Games participants judged the fairness of hypothetical o>ers 
and were asked about their punishment expectation and own punishment expenses, were 
they in the role of the recipient. ;ese questions were answered while participants were still 
within the TMS aGer e>ect time window (approximately 7 min TMS aGer e>ects). 
Our results show that TMS over the right but not leG DLPFC increased selFsh behavior 
in the classical Dictator Game. ;is provides further evidence for a role of the right DLPFC 
in overriding selFsh impulses. Furthermore, the di>erence in transfers between the classical 
Dictator Game and the one with the punishment option was smaller when the right DLPFC 
was disrupted, suggesting that the right DLPFC is involved in a strategic acquisition of con-
trolling selFsh impulses. ;ese results cannot be explained by altered fairness perception or 
36 Part II 
punishment expectations. Both fairness perception and punishment expectations did not 
change across TMS conditions. However, participants indicated that they would use less 
money in order to punish unfair transfers from others if they would be in the role of the 
receiver.  
To sum up, disruption of the right DLPFC impaired the strategic acquisition of the con-
trol of selFsh impulses without altering fairness perception and punishment expectations. 
Participants knew that their transfers in the Dictator Game were unfair and expected to be 
punished for them but made them anyway. In line with Baumgartner et al. (2011; see section 
“;e neural basis of decision making in the Ultimatum Game”) these results provide further 
evidence for the hypothesis that fairness perceptions and punishment expectations are pro-
cessed not in the DLPFC but in other brain regions. Moreover, although perceiving small 
transfers as unfair, when asked to imagine being the receiver participants were less willing to 
punish unfair behavior of others. ;is Fnding is in line with the results of Knoch et al. (2006) 
and shows that in both roles, as dictators and receivers, participants act more selFshly when 
the right DLPFC is disrupted. Ultimately, this implies that less unfair behavior would be pun-
ished and more selFsh behavior would be tolerated, indicating that the right DLPFC is not 
only crucially involved in the compliance but also in the enforcement of fairness norms. 
3 Study 2: The neural correlates of forgiving 
unfair behavior 
Published in Sabrina Strang, Verena Utikal, Urs Fischbacher, Bernd Weber and Armin 
Falk (2014). Neural correlates of receiving an apology and active forgiveness. PlosOne, 5 
(12), e14187.  
Unfair behavior challenges relationships and people’s belief in a just world. One possible pro-
cess to rebuild relationships is the act of apologizing. People are more willing to forgive unfair 
behavior aGer an apology compared to no apology (Fischbacher & Utikal, 2013; McCullough, 
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Fincham, & Tsang, 2003). ;erefore, apologizing and forgiving are both important factors of 
restorative justice (for more details see sections “Restorative justice”). Forgiveness is associ-
ated with decreased negative emotions and increased empathy towards the person who be-
haved unfairly (Fincham, Paleari, & Regalia, 2002; Macaskill, Maltby, & Day, 2002; 
McCullough et al., 1998). Moreover, forgiveness was found to be associated with several brain 
regions, amongst others the leG ventromedial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex 
and right temporo-parietal junction (Farrow et al., 2001; Hayashi et al., 2010; Young & Saxe, 
2009).  However, all of these studies used di>erent paradigms to operationalize forgiveness 
and none of the studies directly investigated brain areas associated with forgiving compared 
to not forgiving. Additionally, these studies used narrative scenarios, where participants were 
asked whether they would forgive a Fctitious person if they were the victim. ;us, forgiveness 
was measured in a rather passive way and neither the unfair behavior nor the act of for-
giveness had any e>ect on participants.  
In the present experiment we combined a behavioral paradigm and neuroscientiFc meth-
ods to investigate the neural correlates of receiving an apology and of active forgiveness. ;e 
game involved two players, player A (transgressor, N = 38) and player B (a>ected person, in 
the scanner, N = 32). We asked players of type A to make decisions which were either fair or 
unfair. In case of an unfair decision, participants in the role of player A could send a message 
to participants in the role of player B. Subsequently players B were asked whether they wanted 
to forgive player A for making an unfair decision. All decision were incentivized, meaning 
that player A’s decision to behave fairly or unfairly had monetary consequences for player B 
and player B’s decision to forgive or not had monetary consequences for player A. In line 
with the psychological literature (McCullough et al., 1998) we hypothesized that apologies 
increased activation in empathy-related brain areas. Furthermore, concerning the neural cor-
relates of forgiveness we expected to Fnd an overlap with the results of Young and Saxe (2009) 
since their paradigm captured our measure of forgiveness most closely. 
Our results support both hypotheses. Receiving an apology versus no apology revealed 
higher activation in the leG middle temporal gyrus, leG angular gyrus and leG inferior frontal 
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gyrus. All three areas have been suggested to be involved in empathy (Carr, Iacoboni, 
Dubeau, Mazziotta, & Lenzi, 2003; Schulte-Rüther, Markowitsch, Fink, & Piebe, 2007). ;e 
results support the theory by McCullough et al. (1998) who suggest that empathy is a medi-
ator between apologies and forgiving.  
Forgiving compared to not forgiving increased activation in the right angular gyrus. Ex-
actly the same area was also found to be activated in the study by Young and Saxe (2009). 
Moreover, this region seems to have a distinct role in social cognition (Carter & Huettel, 
2013). Since forgiveness is a highly social process, our results provide additional evidence for 
an important role of the right angular gyrus in social cognition. We further replicate the Fnd-
ing from Fischbacher and Utikal (2010) that player B was more willing to forgive player A 
when player A had sent an apology. We showed that apologies likely invoke empathy for the 
o>ender and thereby increase the willingness to forgive and that forgiveness recruits a brain 
area known to be particularly involved in social cognition.  
4 Study 3: The neural correlates of fairness norm 
maintenance 
Published in Yang Hu, Sabrina Strang and Bernd Weber (2015). Helping or punishing 
strangers. Neural correlates of altruistic decisions as third party and of its relation to em-
pathic concern. Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 9 (24), 1-11. 
Social norms are a cornerstone of human society. As described in the section “Maintenance 
of social norms” the maintenance of social norms oGen depends on external enforcement. 
When observing a social norm transgression as a third party two enforcement mechanisms 
are possible: we can either help the victim or punish the violator when social norms are vio-
lated (e.g. fairness norm). Punishing the o>ender is referred to as retributive justice (Hogan 
and Emler, 1981) and helping the victim is referred to as compensatory justice (Darley and 
Pittman, 2003). Usually people have to choose whom they want to focus on (i.e., the o>ender 
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or the victim); they have to decide whether they want the o>ender to pay for what he or she 
did, or whether they want to restore the harm done to the victim (Schroeder et al., 2003). 
Helping a victim as well as punishing a norm violator as a third-party (outside observer) can 
be regarded as altruistic acts. Both cost people at least time and e>ort but provide no direct 
beneFts. A recent behavioral study found that third-party help and punishment decisions are 
modulated by empathy (Leliveld et al., 2012). However, the neural underpinnings of third-
party help and punishment and how empathy is involved in these processes still remains un-
clear. In the present study we used fMRI to address these questions. 
Eighty-four participants were in the role of the Frst and second parties in a dictator game 
and thirty-six participants were tested as third parties in the scanner. While lying in the scan-
ner participants saw transgression from the Frst party (i.e. unfair allocations in the Dictator 
Game) and could decide to either punish the violator (i.e. the Frst party) or help the victim 
(i.e. the second party). In a control condition these decisions were made by the computer. 
Empathy was measured using the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) scale aGer scanning.  
Both helping the victim and punishing the violator elicited similar activity in reward-
related brain regions (i.e. bilateral ventral striatum). ;e contrast between help and punish 
yielded no signiFcant activation. Moreover, IRI scores positively correlated with activation in 
the leG lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) as well as in the leG inferior parietal lobule (IPL) and 
angular gyrus (AG) for the contrast between help and punishment. ;e psycho-physiological 
interaction (PPI) analysis further indicated that the functional connectivity between the right 
lPFC and the bilateral striatum increased during help decisions, whereas the leG lPFC showed 
enhanced functional connectivity with bilateral striatum during punishment decisions.  
;ese results suggest that the mechanism underlying third-party help and punishment 
are similar, both are accompanied by activity in reward related areas. Further, it was shown 
that high empathic people recruit di>erent brain areas compared to low empathic people in 
order to help or punish. ;ese results provide evidence for understanding the neural basis of 
social norm enforcement and its between-subject variability. 
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5 Study 4: Writing regulates negative emotions 
due to unfair behavior 
Will be published as Sabrina Strang, Xenia Grote, Katarina Kuss, Soyoung Q Park and 
Bernd Weber. Generalized Negative Reciprocity – How to Interrupt the Chain of 
Unfairness 
Being treated unfairly by others elicits negative emotions (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; Sanfey 
et al., 2003; Van’t Wout et al., 2006). According to Straub and Murnighan (1995) these nega-
tive emotions lead people to make emotion-driven decisions like rejecting unfair o>ers in the 
Ultimatum Game (see section “Emotions” for more details). Emotion regulation strategies 
might help to alter decision making in these situations. Previous research has shown that 
primarily reappraisal is a strategy successful in regulating negative emotions in social situa-
tions (Grecucci, Giorgetta, Van’t Wout, Bonini, & Sanfey, 2013). However, most studies on 
emotion regulation in the Ultimatum Game have two weaknesses. First, rejection rates were 
used as a measure of emotion regulation success. Since altered rejection rates are only an 
indirect measure of a change in emotions, this measurement might not reTect the true e>ect. 
Second, reappraisal is an antecedent-focused emotion regulation strategy, meaning that the 
strategy has to be applied before the emotions that need to be controlled are elicited.  
In our study we tried to resolve these limitations by, Frst, using the Dictator Game and a 
direct emotion measurement and, second, testing a response-focused emotion regulation, 
namely writing a message. We hypothesized that writing a message decreased negative emo-
tions due to unfair o>ers in the Dictator Game.  
One group of participants (N = 24) played the role of the dictator in a Mini-Dictator 
Game. ;ey had to decide between a fair and an unfair o>er. ;e other group of participants 
(total N = 213, all female) received those o>ers from the dictators. 80% of the o>ers were 
unfair, and only the data of participants receiving one of these unfair o>ers was analyzed. 
Subsequently, receivers were asked to write a message to the dictator who made the unfair 
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o>er. ;e Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM, arousal, dominance and pleasure were measured) 
was used to measure emotions at three time points: at baseline, aGer the participant received 
the unfair o>er and aGer emotion regulation.  
;e following three experimental conditions and a control condition were applied. In one 
condition the message was forwarded to the dictator, in the second condition participants 
were asked to write a message to the dictator but it was not forwarded and in the third con-
dition participants were asked to describe an emotionally neutral picture. In the control con-
dition participants were instructed to simply wait for three minutes until the experiment con-
tinued.  
We found that unfair o>ers elicited negative emotions. Participants were more aroused 
and felt less pleasure and dominance aGer they had received an unfair o>er compared to 
baseline. Writing a message which is forwarded successfully regulated emotion; pleasure rat-
ings were higher aGer participants had written the messages. Pleasure ratings were not altered 
by the others conditions compared to baseline. Dominance and arousal ratings did not 
change in any of the conditions.  
;e experimental design allowed us to distinguish between several factors that might ex-
plain the underlying process. Describing a picture did not have an e>ect on pleasure; there-
fore the writing process itself can be ruled out as a crucial factor in the emotion regulation 
process. Furthermore, a pure time factor cannot explain the e>ect as well; in the control con-
dition participants waited for 3 minutes but emotion ratings did not change. As hypothesized, 
writing a message to the one who treated you unfairly is a successful response-focused emo-
tion regulation strategy. ;erefore, we conclude that ordering and expression of thoughts 
while writing a message and forwarding this message are a key factors in emotion regulation 
strategies. 
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6 Conclusion 
All four studies described in part II of this dissertation investigated fairness, but with di>erent 
methods and from di>erent perspectives. Together they provide an improved understanding 
of fair/unfair behavior from a Frst-party (person who behaves fairly/unfairly) second-party 
(person who is treated fairly/unfairly) and third-party (person who observes someone else 
being treated fairly/unfairly) perspective.  
Study 1 shows that the right DLPFC is involved in fair behavior in both Frst and second 
parties. Previous fMRI as well as TMS studies have investigated responses to fair and selFsh 
behavior (second party) and have shown that the right DLPFC is involved in controlling self-
ish impulses that lead to the rejection of unfair o>ers by receivers in the Ultimatum Game 
(Knoch et al., 2006; Sanfey et al., 2003). We extend these Fndings and show that even when 
subjects can actively decide to behave fairly or unfairly as a dictator in the Dictator Game 
(Frst party) the right DLPFC controls the selFsh impulse to keep as much as possible and 
thereby enforces fair behavior. We further suggest that this control is used in a strategic way. 
Conversely, this implies that enhanced right DLPFC activity, thus a better control of selFsh 
impulses, would increase fair behavior. Further research should test whether this hypothesis 
holds true. For instance, a self-control intervention that fosters cognitive control and in-
creases right DLPFC activation might give rise to more prosocial behavior. 
Once you lose your self-control, let your selFsh impulse win and are unfair against an-
other person an apology can help to rebuild the relationship to this person. ;is was shown 
in study 2. We provided evidence that apologies trigger activity in empathy-related brain ar-
eas in the person who was treated unfairly and that apologies increase forgiveness. Moreover, 
we associated forgiving with activity in the right angular gyrus, an area known to be involved 
in many social tasks (Carter, Bowling, Reeck, & Huettel, 2012; Carter & Huettel, 2013). It 
would be interesting to investigate whether di>erences in trait empathy correlate with for-
giveness. If empathy is a mediator between apologies and forgiveness, highly empathic people 
should tend to forgive more oGen compared to low empathic people. Furthermore a TMS 
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study could test whether the right angular gyrus is causally involved in the process of for-
giveness. If so, disruption of this region by TMS should decrease forgiveness.  
In study 3 we show that there are two ways two maintain fairness norms as a third party. 
People can either punish the norm violator or help the victim, both types of behavior have 
the same consequence in that they diminish the inequality between violator and victim. We 
showed that both processes share a common neuronal basis, but that speciFc networks are 
additionally involved in the two processes. Individual di>erences in empathic concern are 
associated with di>erent networks involved in the two processes. It would be interesting to 
investigate these individual di>erences in more detail by testing the two extremes; people 
very high in empathic concern and people very low in empathic concern. ;is might provide 
further insights in individual di>erences of the neuronal basis of third party help and pun-
ishment. 
As a second party you have an emotional response to unfairness. In the fourth study we 
showed that unfairness decreased pleasure and dominance and increased arousal. We could 
further show that people can regulate their negative emotions by writing a message to the 
person who has treated them unfairly and that this message does not need to be forwarded 
in order to be e>ective. Open questions are, Frst, whether this emotion regulation has an 
impact on subsequent decisions concerning the person who was unfair as well as other people 
and, second, whether this emotion regulation strategy can be used repeatedly. Both should 
be investigated in further studies. 
To sum up, fairness is a highly complex social behavior that requires control of selFsh 
impulses. When disregarded, it should be followed by an apology since it elicits negative emo-
tions in the other person. 
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